

JAVA SECURITY MYTHS

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bridgingIT






Secure Communication

Cross-Site Scripting

Cross-Site Request Forgery



Secure Communication



HTTPS after log-in form is enough

Log-in form manipulation and interception



HTTP Strict Transport Security Header (HSTS)

```
protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request,  
    HttpServletResponse response) {  
    response.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security",  
        "max-age=2592000; includeSubDomains");
```




HSTS policy requires browser support





Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

XSS - what?



Browser executes
code from attacker



**DOM Based
XSS**

**Reflected
XSS**

**Stored
XSS**



Modern frameworks automatically provide protection

JavaServer Faces automatically escape all output

`<script>alert('XSS with JSF')</script>`

Submit

`<h:outputText />`

`<script>alert('XSS with`



`<h:selectOneMenu />`

`<script>alert('XSS with JSF')</script>`

XSS in action

Don't take framework security for granted



Don't regard your code and libraries as separate units



Always update third party libraries



Verify your dependencies are up-to-date

```
Ch06_SQLInjection — bash — 70x5
Last login: Sat Mar 29 12:02:14 on ttys004
marvin:Ch06_SQLInjection dos$ mvn dependency:copy-dependencies
```

Maven

```
Ch06_SQLInjection — bash — 60x5
marvin:Ch06_SQLInjection dos$ dependency-check.sh --app XSS
-out . --scan target/dependency/
```

Dependency-Check Report

Project: XSS

Scan Information ([show all](#)):

- *dependency-check version: 1.1.3*
- *Report Generated On: 29.03.2014 12:08:29*
- *Dependencies Scanned: 37*
- *Vulnerable Dependencies: 1*
- ...

Dependency Display: [show all](#)

- [commons-fileupload-1.2.jar](#)

OWASP
Dependency Check

Input validate, output escape



Use escaping libraries with security focus



OWASP Java Encoder * Coverity Security Library

OWASP HTML Sanitizer

Intercepting proxy to avoid validation when testing







Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

CSRF - what?





POST forms protect from **CSRF**



``




```
protected void doGet(request, response)
```


Replace GET with **POST** requests

```
<form method="post" action="MyServlet">
```

```

```



```
protected void doPost(request, response)
```

Add more dynamic with **XMLHttpRequest**




HAP

JavaScript may submit POST forms

```
<form method="post" action="MyServlet">
```

```
protected void doPost(request, response)
```



```
var request = new XMLHttpRequest();  
request.open("POST", "Servlet-URL");  
request.send("name=ATTACK");
```

Add hidden anti CSRF forgery token to each form




CSRF in action



Intranet applications are safe

CSRF attacks don't stop at firewalls



Developers make
the difference





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Demo Projects

github.com/dschadow/JavaSecurityMyths

Coverity Security Library

github.com/coverity/coverity-security-library

JSF Escaping Bug

java.net/jira/browse/JAVASERVERFACES-2747

OWASP HTML Sanitizer

www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project

OWASP Java Encoder

www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project

OWASP Dependency Check

www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check

OWASP Zed Attack Proxy

www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project

Pictures

www.dreamstime.com www.istockphoto.com

